We apply formal methods to lay and streamline theoretical foundations to reason about Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and physics-based attacks, i.e., attacks targeting physical devices. We focus on a formal treatment of both integrity and denial of service attacks to sensors and actuators of CPSs, and on the timing aspects of these attacks. Our contributions are fourfold. (1) We define a hybrid process calculus to model both CPSs and physics-based attacks. (2) We formalise a threat model that specifies MITM attacks that can manipulate sensor readings or control commands to drive a CPS into an undesired state; we group these attacks into classes and provide the means to assess attack tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given class of attacks, based on a proper notion of most powerful physics-based attack. (3) We formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible quantifications of the success chances of an attack. (4) We illustrate our definitions and results by formalising a non-trivial running example in Uppaal SMC, the statistical extension of the Uppaal model checker; we use Uppaal SMC as an automatic tool for carrying out a static security analysis of our running example in isolation and when exposed to three different physics-based attacks with different impacts.
A Formal Approach to Physics-based Attacks in Cyber-physical Systems 3:3 noise, respectively, and A, B, and C are matrices modelling the dynamics of the physical system. Here, the next state x k+1 depends on the current state x k and the corresponding control actions u k , at the sampling instant k ∈ N. The state x k cannot be directly observed: only its measurements y k can be observed.
The physical plant is supported by a communication network through which the sensor measurements and actuator data are exchanged with controller(s) and supervisor(s) (e.g., IDSs), which are the cyber components (also called logics) of a CPS.
Contributions
In this article, we focus on a formal treatment of both integrity and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to physical devices (sensors and actuators) of CPSs, paying particular attention to the timing aspects of these attacks. The overall goal of the article is to apply formal methodologies to lay theoretical foundations to reason about and formally detect attacks to physical devices of CPSs. A straightforward utilisation of these methodologies is for model-checking (as, e.g., in Reference [19] ) or monitoring (as, e.g., in Reference [4] ) to be able to verify security properties of CPSs either before system deployment or, when static analysis is not feasible, at runtime to promptly detect undesired behaviours. In other words, we aim at providing an essential stepping stone for formal and automated analysis techniques for checking the security of CPSs (rather than for providing defence techniques, i.e., mitigation [45] ).
Our contribution is fourfold. The first contribution is the definition of a hybrid process calculus, called CCPSA, to formally specify both CPSs and physics-based attacks. In CCPSA, CPSs have two components:
• a physical component denoting the physical plant (also called environment) of the system, and containing information on state variables, actuators, sensors, evolution law, and so on, and • a cyber component that governs access to sensors and actuators, and channel-based communication with other cyber components.
Thus, channels are used for logical interactions between cyber components, whereas sensors and actuators make possible the interaction between cyber and physical components. CCPSA adopts a discrete notion of time [27] , and it is equipped with a labelled transition semantics (LTS) that allows us to observe both physical events (system deadlock and violations of safety conditions) and cyber events (channel communications). Based on our LTS, we define two compositional trace-based system preorders: a deadlock-sensitive trace preorder, , and a timed variant, m..n , for m ∈ N + and n ∈ N + ∪ {∞}, which takes into account discrepancies of execution traces within the discrete time interval m..n. Intuitively, given two CPSs Sys 1 and Sys 2 , we write Sys 1 m..n Sys 2 if Sys 2 simulates the execution traces of Sys 1 , except for the time interval m..n; if n = ∞, then the simulation only holds for the first m − 1 time slots.
As a second contribution, we formalise a threat model that specifies man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that can manipulate sensor readings or control commands to drive a CPS into an undesired state [55] . 2 Without loss of generality, MITM attacks targeting physical devices (sensors or actuators) can be assimilated to physical attacks, i.e., those attacks that directly compromise physical devices (e.g., electromagnetic attacks). As depicted in Figure 1 , our attacks may affect directly the sensor measurements or the controller commands: • Attacks on sensors consist of reading and eventually replacing y k (the sensor measurements) with y a k . • Attacks on actuators consist of reading, dropping, and eventually replacing the controller commands u k with u a k , affecting directly the actions the actuators may execute. We group attacks into classes. A class of attacks takes into account both the potential malicious activities I on physical devices and the timing parameters m and n of the attack: begin and end of the attack. We represent a class C as a total function C ∈ [I → P(m..n)]. Intuitively, for ι ∈ I, C (ι) ⊆ m..n denotes the set of time instants when an attack of class C may tamper with the device ι.
To make security assessments on our CPSs, we adopt a well-known approach called Generalized Non Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) [17] . Thus, in our calculus CCPSA, we say that a CPS Systolerates an attack A if Sys A Sys . In this case, the presence of the attack A does not change the (physical and logical) observable behaviour of the system Sys, and the attack can be considered harmless.
However, we say that a CPS Sys is vulnerable to an attack A of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] if there is a time interval m ..n in which the attack becomes observable (obviously, m ≥ m). Formally, we write:
Sys A m ..n Sys . We provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary class C. We define a notion of most powerful physics-based attack of a given class C, Top(C), and prove that if a CPS tolerates Top(C), then it tolerates all attacks A of class C (and of any weaker class 3 ). Similarly, if a CPS is vulnerable to Top(C), in the time interval m ..n , then no attacks of class C (or weaker) can affect the system out of that time interval. This is very useful when checking for attack tolerance/vulnerability with respect to all attacks of a given class C.
As a third contribution, we formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS. As expected, risk assessment in industrial CPSs is a crucial phase preceding any defence strategy implementation [54] . The objective of this phase is to prioritise among vulnerabilities; this is done based on the likelihood that vulnerabilities are exploited and the impact on the system under attack if exploitation occurs. In this manner, the resources can then be focused on preventing the most critical vulnerabilities [44] . We provide a metric to estimate the maximum perturbation introduced in the system under attack with respect to its genuine behaviour, according to its evolution law and the uncertainty of the model. Then, we prove that the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C) represents an upper bound for the impact of any attack A of class C (or weaker).
Finally, as a fourth contribution, we formalise a running example in Uppaal SMC [15] , the statistical extension of the Uppaal model checker [5] supporting the analysis of systems expressed as composition of timed and/or probabilistic automata. Our goal is to test Uppaal SMC as an automatic tool for the static security analysis of a simple but significant CPS exposed to a number of different physics-based attacks with different impacts on the system under attack. Here, we wish to remark that while we have kept our running example simple, it is actually non-trivial and designed to describe a wide number of attacks, as will become clear below.
This article extends and supersedes a preliminary conference version that appeared in Reference [40] . All the results presented in the current article have been formally proven, although, due to lack of space, proofs of minor statements can be found in the associated technical report [39] . The Uppaal SMC models of our system and the attacks that we have found are available at the repository https://bitbucket.org/AndreiMunteanu/cps_smc/src/.
Organisation
In Section 2, we give syntax and semantics of CCPSA. In Section 3, we provide our running example and its formalisation in Uppaal SMC. In Section 4, we first define our threat model for physicsbased attacks; then, we use Uppaal SMC to carry out a security analysis of our running example when exposed to three different attacks; and, finally, we provide sufficient criteria for attack tolerance/vulnerability, based on a proper notion of most powerful attack. In Section 5, we estimate the impact of attacks on CPSs and prove that the most powerful attack of a given class has the maximum impact with respect to all attacks of the same class (or of a weaker one). In Section 6, we draw conclusions and discuss related and future work.
THE CALCULUS
In this section, we introduce our Calculus of Cyber-Physical Systems and Attacks, CCPSA, which extends the Calculus of Cyber-physical Systems, defined in our companion papers [37, 42] , with specific features to formalise and study attacks to physical devices.
Let us start with some preliminary notation.
Syntax of CCPSA
Notation 1. We use x, x k for state variables (associated to physical states of systems), c, d for communication channels, a, a k for actuator devices, and s, s k for sensor devices. Actuator names are metavariables for actuator devices such as valve, light, and so on. Similarly, sensor names are metavariables for sensor devices, e.g., a sensor thermometer that measures a state variable called temperature, with a given precision.
Values, ranged over by v, v , w, are built from basic values, such as Booleans, integers, and real numbers; they also include names.
Given a generic set of names N , we write R N to denote the set of functions assigning a real value to each name in N . For ξ ∈ R N , n ∈ N , and v ∈ R, we write ξ [n → v] to denote the function ψ ∈ R N such that ψ (m) = ξ (m), for any m n, and ψ (n) = v. Given two generic functions ξ 1 and ξ 2 with disjoint domains N 1 and N 2 , respectively, we denote with
In general, a cyber-physical system consists of: (i) a physical component (defining state variables, physical devices, physical evolution, etc.) and (ii) a cyber (or logical) component that interacts with the physical devices (sensors and actuators) and communicates with other cyber components of the same or of other CPSs.
Physical components in CCPSA are given by two sub-components: (i) the physical state, which is supposed to change at runtime, and (ii) the physical environment, which contains static information. 4 3:6 R. Lanotte et al.
Definition 2.1 (Physical State)
. Let X be a set of state variables, S be a set of sensors, and A be a set of actuators. A physical state S is a triple ξ x , ξ s , ξ a , where:
All functions defining a physical state are total.
The state function ξ x returns the current value associated to each variable in X, the sensor function ξ s returns the current value associated to each sensor in S, and the actuator function ξ a returns the current value associated to each actuator in A.
Definition 2.2 (Physical Environment)
. Let X be a set of state variables, S be a set of sensors, and A be a set of actuators. A physical environment E is a 6-tuple evol, meas, inv, safe, ξ w , ξ e , where:
All functions defining a physical environment are total functions.
The evolution map evol models the evolution law of the physical system, where changes made on actuators may reflect on state variables. Given a state function, an actuator function, and an uncertainty function, the evolution map evol returns the set of next admissible state functions. Since we assume an uncertainty in our models, evol does not return a single state function but a set of possible state functions.
The measurement map meas returns the set of next admissible sensor functions based on the current state function. Since we assume error-prone sensors, meas does not return a single sensor function but a set of possible sensor functions.
The invariant set inv represents the set of state functions that satisfies the invariant of the system. A CPS that gets into a physical state with a state function that does not satisfy the invariant is in deadlock. Similarly, the safety set safe represents the set of state functions that satisfies the safety conditions of the system. Intuitively, if a CPS gets into an unsafe state, then its functionality may get compromised.
The uncertainty function ξ w returns the uncertainty (or accuracy) associated to each state variable. Thus, given a state variable x ∈ X, ξ w (x ) returns the maximum distance between the real value of x, in an arbitrary moment in time, and its representation in the model. For
for any x ∈ X. The evolution map evol is obviously monotone with respect to uncertainty:
Finally, the sensor-error function ξ e returns the maximum error associated to each sensor in S.
Let us now define formally the cyber component of a CPS in CCPSA. Our (logical) processes build on Hennessy and Regan's Timed Process Language TPL [27] , basically, CCS enriched with a discrete notion of time. We extend TPL with two main ingredients:
• two constructs to read values detected at sensors and write values on actuators, respectively; • special constructs to represent malicious activities on physical devices.
The remaining constructs are the same as those of TPL. 
We write nil for the terminated process. The process tick.P sleeps for one time unit and then continues as P. We write P Q to denote the parallel composition of concurrent threads P and Q. The process π .P denotes channel transmission. The construct ϕ.P denotes activities on physical devices, i.e., sensor reading and actuator writing. The process μ.P Q denotes MITM malicious activities under timeout targeting physical devices (sensors and actuators). More precisely, we support sensor sniffing, drop of actuator commands, and integrity attacks on data coming from sensors and addressed to actuators. Thus, for instance, drop a(x ).P Q drops a command on the actuator a supplied by the controller in the current time slot; otherwise, if there are no commands on a, it moves to the next time slot and evolves into Q.
The process P\c is the channel restriction operator of CCS. We sometimes write P\{c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n } to mean P\c 1 \c 2 · · · \c n . The process if (b) {P } else {Q } is the standard conditional, where b is a decidable guard. In processes of the form tick.Q and μ.P Q, the occurrence of Q is said to be time-guarded. The process H w denotes (guarded) recursion.
We assume a set of process identifiers ranged over by H , H 1 , H 2 . We write H w 1 , . . . ,w k to denote a recursive process H defined via an equation H (x 1 , . . . , x k ) = P, where (i) the tuple x 1 , . . . , x k contains all the variables that appear free in P and (ii) P contains only guarded occurrences of the process identifiers, such as H itself. We say that recursion is time-guarded if P contains only timeguarded occurrences of the process identifiers. Unless explicitly stated, our recursive processes are always time-guarded.
In the constructs rcv c (x ).P, read s (x ).P, sniff s (x ).P Q, and drop a(x ).P Q, the variable x is said to be bound. This gives rise to the standard notions of free/bound (process) variables and αconversion. A term is closed if it does not contain free variables, and we assume to always work with closed processes: The absence of free variables is preserved at runtime. As further notation, we write T { v / x } for the substitution of all occurrences of the free variable x in T with the value v.
Everything is in place to provide the definition of cyber-physical systems expressed in CCPSA.
Definition 2.4 (Cyber-physical System). Given a set of state variables X, a set of sensors S, and a set of actuators A, a cyber-physical system in CCPSA is given by two main components:
• a physical component consisting of -a physical environment E defined on X, S, and A, and -a physical state S recording the current values associated to the state variables in X, the sensors in S, and the actuators in A; • a cyber component P that interacts with the sensors in S and the actuators A, and can communicate, via channels, with other cyber components of the same or of other CPSs.
We write E; S P to denote the resulting CPS and use M and N to range over CPSs. Sometimes, when the physical environment E is clearly identified, we write S P instead of E; S P. CPSs of the form S P are called environment-free CPSs.
The syntax of our CPSs is slightly too permissive, as a process might use sensors and/or actuators that are not defined in the physical state. To rule out ill-formed CPSs, we use the following definition: 
Definition 2.5 (Well-formedness)
. Let E = evol, meas, inv, safe, ξ w , ξ e be a physical environment, let S = ξ x , ξ s , ξ a be a physical state defined on a set of physical variables X, a set of sensors S, and a set of actuators A, and let P be a process. The CPS E; S P is said to be well-formed if: (i) any sensor mentioned in P is in the domain of the function ξ s ; (ii) any actuator mentioned in P is in the domain of the function ξ a .
In the rest of the article, we will always work with well-formed CPSs and use the following abbreviations: Notation 2. We write μ.P for the process defined via the equation Q = μ.P Q, where Q does not occur in P. Further, we write • μ Q as an abbreviation for μ.nil Q, • μ.P as an abbreviation for μ.P nil,
• snd c and rcv c, when channel c is used for pure synchronisation, • tick k .P as a shorthand for tick . . . tick.P, where the prefix tick appears k ≥ 0 consecutive times.
Finally, let M = E; S P, we write M Q for E; S (P Q ), and M\c for E; S (P\c).
Labelled Transition Semantics
In this subsection, we provide the dynamics of CCPSA in terms of a labelled transition system (LTS) in the SOS style of Plotkin. First, we give in Table 1 an LTS for logical processes, then in Table 2 , we lift transition rules from processes to environment-free CPSs. 
In Table 1 , the meta-variable λ ranges over labels in the set {tick, τ , cv, cv, a!v, s?v, p!v, p?v}. Rules (Outp), (Inpp), and (Com) serve to model channel communication on some channel c. Rules (Read) and (Write) denote sensor reading and actuator writing, respectively. The following three rules model three different MITM malicious activities: sensor sniffing, dropping of actuator commands, and integrity attacks on data coming from sensors or addressed to actuators. In particular, rule ( ActDrop ) models a DoS attack to the actuator a, where the update request of the controller is dropped by the attacker and it never reaches the actuator, whereas rule ( SensIntegr ) models an integrity attack on sensor s, as the controller of s is supplied with a fake value v forged by the attack. Rule (Par) propagates untimed actions over parallel components. Rules (Res), (Rec), (Then), and (Else) are standard. The four rules (TimeNil), (Sleep), (TimeOut), and (TimePar) model the passage of time. For simplicity, we omit the symmetric counterparts of the rules (Com), ( ActDrop ), ( SensIntegr ), and (Par).
In Table 2 , we lift the transition rules from processes to environment-free CPSs of the form S P for S = ξ x , ξ s , ξ a . The transition rules are parametric on a physical environment E. Except for rule (Deadlock), all rules have a common premise ξ x ∈ inv: a system can evolve only if the invariant is satisfied by the current physical state. Here, actions, ranged over by α, are in the set {τ , cv, cv, tick, deadlock, unsafe}. These actions denote: internal activities (τ ); channel transmission (cv and cv); the passage of time (tick); and two specific physical events: system deadlock (deadlock) and the violation of the safety conditions (unsafe). Rules (Out) and (Inp) model transmission and reception, with an external system, on a channel c. Rule (SensRead) models the reading of the current data detected at a sensor s; here, the presence of a malicious action s!w would prevent the reading of the sensor. We already said that rule ( SensIntegr ) of Table 1 models integrity attacks on a sensor s. However, together with rule (SensRead), it also serves to implicitly model DoS attacks on a sensor s, as the controller of s cannot read its correct value if the attacker is currently supplying a fake value for it. Rule ( SensSniff ) allows the attacker to read the confidential value detected at a sensor s. Rule (ActWrite) models the writing of a value v on an actuator a; here, the presence of an attack capable of performing a drop action a?v prevents the access to the actuator by the controller. Rule ( ActIntegr ) models an MITM integrity attack to an actuator a, as the actuator is provided with a value forged by the attack. Rule (Tau) lifts non-observable actions from processes to systems. This includes communications channels and attacks' accesses to physical devices. A similar lifting occurs in rule (Time) for timed actions, where next(E; S ) returns the set of possible physical states for the next time slot. Formally, for E = evol, meas, inv, safe, ξ w , ξ e and S = ξ x , ξ s , ξ a , we define:
Thus, by an application of rule (Time), a CPS moves to the next physical state in the next time slot. Rule (Deadlock) is introduced to signal the violation of the invariant. When the invariant is violated, a system deadlock occurs and then, in CCPSA, the system emits a special action deadlock, forever. Similarly, rule (Safety) is introduced to detect the violation of safety conditions. In this case, the system may emit a special action unsafe and then continue its evolution. Summarising, in the LTS of Table 2 These attacks can always prevent the regular access to a physical device by its controller.
Behavioural Semantics
Having defined the actions that can be performed by a CPS of the form E; S P, we can easily concatenate these actions to define the possible execution traces of the system. Formally, given a trace t = α 1 . . . α n , we will write t − −− → as an abbreviation for
− −− →, and we will use the function #tick(t ) to get the number of occurrences of the action tick in t.
The notion of trace allows us to provide a formal definition of system soundness: A CPS is said to be sound if it never deadlocks and never violates the safety conditions. Definition 2.6 (System Soundness). Let M be a well-formed CPS. We say that M is sound if whenever M t − −− → M , for some t, the actions deadlock and unsafe never occur in t.
In our security analysis, we will always focus on sound CPSs. We recall that the observable activities in CCPSA are: time passing, system deadlock, violation of safety conditions, and channel communication. Having defined a labelled transition semantics, we are ready to formalise our behavioural semantics, based on execution traces. We adopt a standard notation for weak transitions: We write =⇒ for ( Remark 2. Unlike other process calculi, in CCPSA our trace preorder is able to observe (physical) deadlock due to the presence of the rule (Deadlock) and the special action deadlock: whenever M N then M eventually deadlocks if and only if N eventually deadlocks (see Lemma A.1 in the Appendix).
Our trace preorder can be used for compositional reasoning in those contexts that do not interfere on physical devices (sensors and actuators), while they may interfere on logical components (via channel communication). In particular, trace preorder is preserved by parallel composition of physically disjoint CPSs, by parallel composition of pure-logical processes, and by channel restriction. Intuitively, two CPSs are physically disjoint if they have different plants but they may share logical channels for communication purposes. More precisely, physically disjoint CPSs have disjoint state variables and disjoint physical devices (sensors and actuators). As we consider only well-formed CPSs (Definition 2.5), this ensures that a CPS cannot physically interfere with a parallel CPS by acting on its physical devices.
Formally, let
ξ i e be physical states and physical environments, respectively, associated to sets of state variables X i , sets of sensors S i , and sets of actuators
• the disjoint union of the physical states S 1 and S 2 , written S 1 S 2 , to be the physical state ξ x , ξ s , ξ a such that:
• the disjoint union of the physical environments E 1 and E 2 , written E 1 E 2 , to be the physical environment evol, meas, inv, safe, ξ w , ξ e such that:
We say that M 1 and M 2 are physically disjoint if S 1 and S 2 have disjoint sets of state variables, sensors, and actuators. In this case, we write M 1 M 2 to denote the CPS defined as (E 1 E 2 ); (S 1 S 2 ) (P 1 P 2 ).
A pure-logical process is a process that may interfere on communication channels, but it never interferes on physical devices, as it never accesses sensors and/or actuators. Basically, a purelogical process is a TPL process [27] . Thus, in a system M Q, where M is an arbitrary CPS, a pure-logical process Q cannot interfere with the physical evolution of M. A process Q can, however, definitely interact with M via communication channels, and hence affect its observable behaviour. Definition 2.9 (Pure-logical Processes). A process P is called pure-logical if it never acts on sensors and/or actuators. Now, we can finally state the compositionality of our trace preorder (the proof can be found in the Appendix). The reader may wonder whether our trace preorder is preserved by more permissive contexts. The answer is no. Suppose that in the second item of Theorem 2.10 we allowed a process P that can also read on sensors. In this case, even if M N , the parallel process P might read a different value in the two systems at the very same sensor s (due to the sensor error) and transmit these different values on a free channel, breaking the congruence. Activities on actuators may also lead to different behaviours of the compound systems: M and N may have physical components that are not exactly aligned. A similar reasoning applies when composing CPSs with non physically disjoint ones: Noise on physical devices may break the compositionality result.
As we are interested in formalising timing aspects of attacks, such as beginning and duration, we propose a timed variant of up to (a possibly infinite) discrete time interval m..n, with m ∈ N + and n ∈ N + ∪ ∞. Intuitively, we write M m..n N if the CPS N simulates the execution traces of M in all time slots, except for those contained in the discrete time interval m..n.
Definition 2.11 (Trace Preorder Up to a Time Interval).
We write M m..n N , for m ∈ N + and n ∈ N + ∪ {∞}, with m ≤ n, if the following conditions hold:
In Definition 2.11, the first item says that N can simulate the traces of M for at most m−1 time slots; whereas the second item says two things: The proof can be found in the Appendix.
A RUNNING EXAMPLE
In this section, we introduce a running example to illustrate how we can precisely represent CPSs and a variety of different physics-based attacks. In practice, we formalise a relatively simple CPS Sys in which the temperature of an engine is maintained within a specific range by means of a cooling system. We wish to remark here that while we have kept the example simple, it is actually far from trivial and designed to describe a wide number of attacks. The main structure of the CPS Sys is shown in Figure 2 .
The CPS Sys
The physical state State of the engine is characterised by: (i) a state variable temp containing the current temperature of the engine, and an integer state variable stress keeping track of the level of stress of the mechanical parts of the engine due to high temperatures (exceeding 9.9 degrees)-this integer variable ranges from 0, meaning no stress, to 5, for high stress; (ii) a sensor s t (such as a thermometer or a thermocouple) measuring the temperature of the engine; (iii) an actuator cool to turn on/off the cooling system. The physical environment of the engine, Env, is constituted by: (i) a simple evolution law evol that increases (respectively, decreases) the value of temp by one degree per time unit when the cooling system is inactive (respectively, active), up to the uncertainty of the system-the variable stress is increased each time the current temperature is above 9.9 degrees and dropped to 0 otherwise; (ii) a measurement map meas returning the value detected by the sensor s t , up to the error associated to the sensor; (iii) an invariant set saying that the system gets faulty when the temperature of the engine gets out of the range [0, 50]; (iv) a safety set to express that the system moves to an unsafe state when the level of stress reaches the threshold 5; (v) an uncertainty function in which each state variable may evolve with an uncertainty δ = 0.4 degrees; (vi) a sensor-error function saying that the sensor s t has an accuracy ϵ = 0.1 degrees.
Formally, State = ξ x , ξ s , ξ a where:
• ξ x ∈ R {temp,stress } and ξ x (temp) = 0 and ξ x (stress) = 0;
• ξ s ∈ R {s t } and ξ s (s t ) = 0;
• ξ a ∈ R {cool } and ξ a (cool) = off (for the sake of simplicity, we can assume ξ a to be a mapping {cool} → {on, off} such that ξ a (cool) = off if ξ a (cool) ≥ 0, and ξ a (cool) = on if ξ a (cool) < 0);
and Env = evol, meas, inv, safe, ξ w , ξ e with:
For the cyber component of the CPS Sys, we define two parallel processes: Ctrl and IDS. The former models the controller activity, consisting in reading the temperature sensor and in governing the cooling system via its actuator, whereas the latter models a simple intrusion detection system that attempts to detect and signal anomalies in the behaviour of the system [23] . Intuitively, Ctrl senses the temperature of the engine at each time slot. When the sensed temperature is above 10 degrees, the controller activates the coolant. The cooling activity is maintained for five consecutive time units. After that time, the controller synchronises with the IDS component via a private channel sync and then waits for instructions via a channel ins. The IDS component checks whether the sensed temperature is still above 10. If this is the case, then it sends an alarm of "high temperature" via a specific channel and then tells Ctrl to keep cooling for five more time units; otherwise, if the temperature is not above 10, the IDS component requires Ctrl to stop the cooling activity.
Thus, the whole CPS is defined as:
For the sake of simplicity, our IDS component is quite basic: For instance, it does not check whether the temperature is too low. However, it is straightforward to replace it with a more sophisticated one, containing more informative tests on sensor values and/or on actuator commands. Figure 3 shows three possible evolutions in time of the state variable temp of Sys: (i) the first one (in red), in which the temperature of the engine always grows by 1 − δ = 0.6 degrees per time unit when the cooling is off, and always decreases by 1 + δ = 1.4 degrees per time unit when the cooling is on; (ii) the second one (in blue), in which the temperature always grows by 1 + δ = 1.4 degrees per time unit when the cooling is off, and always decreases by 1 − δ = 0.6 degrees per time unit when the cooling is on; (iii) and a third one (in yellow), in which, depending on whether the cooling is off or on, at each time step the temperature grows or decreases by an arbitrary offset lying in the interval [ 
Our operational semantics allows us to formally prove a number of properties of our running example. For instance, Proposition 3.1 says that the Sys is sound and it never fires the alarm.
Actually, we can be quite precise on the temperature reached by Sys before and after the cooling: In each of the five rounds of cooling, the temperature will drop by a value lying in the real interval [1−δ, 1+δ ], where δ is the uncertainty. Proposition 3.2. For any execution trace of Sys, we have:
• when Sys turns on the cooling, the value of the state variable temp ranges over (9.9, 11.5];
• when Sys turns off the cooling, the value of the variable temp ranges over (2.9, 8.5]. The proofs of the Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 can be found in the associated technical report [39] . In the following section, we will verify the safety properties stated in these two propositions relying on the statistical model checker Uppaal SMC [15] .
A Formalisation of Sys in Uppaal SMC
In this section, we formalise our running example in Uppaal SMC [15] , the statistical extension of the Uppaal model checker [5] supporting the analysis of systems expressed as composition of timed and/or probabilistic automata. In Uppaal SMC, the user must specify two main statistical parameters α and ϵ, ranging in the interval [0, 1] and representing the probability of false negatives and probabilistic uncertainty, respectively. Thus, given a CTL property of the system under investigation, the tool returns a probability estimate for that property, lying in a confidence interval [p − ϵ, p + ϵ], for some probability p ∈ [0, 1], with an accuracy 1 − α. The number of necessary runs to ensure the required accuracy is then computed by the tool relying on the Chernoff-Hoeffding theory [12] .
3.2.1
Model. The Uppaal SMC model of our use case Sys is given by three main components represented in terms of parallel timed automata: the physical component, the network, and the logical component.
The physical component, whose model is shown in Figure 4 , consists of four automata: (i) the _Engine_ automaton, which governs the evolution of the variable temp by means of the heat and cool functions; (ii) the _Sensor_ automaton, which updates the global variable sens at each measurement request; (iii) the _Actuator_ automaton, which activates/deactivates the cooling system; (iv) the _Safety_ automaton, which handles the integer variable stress via the update_stress function, and the Boolean variables safe and deadlocks, associated to the safety set safe and the invariant set inv of Sys, respectively. 5 We also have a small automaton to model a discrete notion of time (via a synchronisation channel tick), as the evolution of state variables is represented via difference equations.
The network, whose model is given in Figure 5 , consists of two proxies: a proxy to relay actuator commands between the actuator device and the controller, a second proxy to relay measurement requests between the sensor device and the logical components (controller and IDS).
The logical component, whose model is given in Figure 6 , consists of two automata: _Ctrl_ and _IDS_ to model the controller and the Intrusion Detection System, respectively; both of them synchronise with their associated proxy, copying a fresh value of sens into their local variables (sens_ctrl and sens_ids, respectively). Under proper conditions, the _IDS_ automaton fires alarms by setting a Boolean variable alarm.
Verification.
We conduct our safety verification using a notebook with the following setup: (i) 2.8 GHz Intel i7 7700 HQ, with 16 GB memory, and Linux Ubuntu 16.04 operating system; (ii) Uppaal SMC model-checker 64-bit, version 4.1.19. The statistical parameters of false negatives (α) and probabilistic uncertainty (ϵ) are both set to 0.01, leading to a confidence level of 99%. As a consequence, having fixed these parameters, for each of our experiments, Uppaal SMC runs a number of runs that may vary from a few hundred to 26,492 (cf. Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds).
We basically use Uppaal SMC to verify properties expressed in terms of time bounded CTL formulae of the form [t 1 ,t 2 ] e pr op and ♦ [0,t 2 ] e pr op , 6 where t 1 and t 2 are time instants according to the discrete representation of time in Uppaal SMC. In practice, we use formulae of the form [t 1 ,t 2 ] e pr op to compute the probability that a property e pr op 7 holds in all time slots of the time interval t 1 ..t 2 , whereas with formulae of the form ♦ [0,t 2 ] e pr op , we calculate the probability that a property e pr op holds in a least one time slot of the time interval 0..t 2 .
Thus, instead of proving Proposition 3.1, we verify-with a 99% accuracy-that in all possible executions that are at most 1K time slots long, the system Sys results to be sound and alarm-free, with probability 0.99. Formally, we verify the following three properties:
• [1, 1000] (¬deadlocks), expressing that the system does not deadlock; • [1, 1000] (safe), expressing that the system does not violate the safety conditions; • [1, 1000] (¬alarm), expressing that the IDS does not fire any alarm.
Furthermore, instead of Proposition 3.2, we verify, with the same accuracy and for runs of the same length (up to a short initial transitory phase lasting five time instants) that if the cooling system is off, then the temperature of the engine lies in the real interval (2.9, 8.5], otherwise it ranges over the interval (9.9, 11.5]. Formally, we verify the following two properties:
• [5, 1000] (Cooling_off ⇒ (temp > 2.9 ∧ temp ≤ 8.5)), • [5, 1000] (Cooling_on ⇒ (temp > 9.9 ∧ temp ≤ 11.5)).
The verification of each of the five properties above requires around 15 minutes. The Uppaal SMC models of our system, and the attacks discussed in the next section are available at the repository https://bitbucket.org/AndreiMunteanu/cps_smc/src/.
Remark 3.
In our Uppaal SMC model, we decided to represent both uncertainty of physical evolution (in the functions heat and cool of _Engine_) and measurement noise (in _Sensor_) in a probabilistic manner via random extractions. Here, the reader may wonder whether it would have been enough to restrict our SMC analysis by considering only upper and lower bounds on these two quantities. Actually, this is not the case, because such a restricted analysis might miss admissible execution traces. To see this, suppose to work with a physical uncertainty that is always either 0.4 or −0.4. Then, the temperature reached by the system would always be of the form n.k, for n, k ∈ N and k even. As a consequence, our analysis would miss all execution traces in which the system reaches the maximum admissible temperature of 11.5 degrees.
PHYSICS-BASED ATTACKS
In this section, we use CCPSA to formalise a threat model of physics-based attacks, i.e., attacks that can manipulate sensor and/or actuator signals to drive a sound CPS into an undesired state [55] . An attack may have different levels of access to physical devices; for example, it might be able to get read access to the sensors but not write access; or it might get write-only access to the actuators but not read-access. This level of granularity is very important to model precisely how physicsbased attacks can affect a CPS [13] . In CCPSA, we have a syntactic way to distinguish malicious processes from honest ones. We group physics-based attacks in classes that describe both the malicious activities and the timing aspects of the attack. Intuitively, a class of attacks provides information about which physical devices are accessed by the attacks of that class, how they are accessed (read and/or write), when the attack begins, and when the attack ends. Thus, let I be the set of all possible malicious activities on the physical devices of a system, m ∈ N + be the time slot when an attack starts, and n ∈ N + ∪ {∞} be the time slot when the attack ends. We then say that an attack A is of class
(1) all possible malicious activities of A coincide with those contained in I;
(2) the first of those activities may occur in the mth time slot but not before;
(3) the last of those activities may occur in the nth time slot but not after; (4) for ι ∈ I, C (ι) returns a (possibly empty) set of time slots when A may read/tamper with the device ι (this set is contained in m..n); (5) C is a total function, i.e., if no attacks of class C can achieve the malicious activity ι ∈ I, then C (ι) = ∅. 
Along the lines of Reference [17] , we can say that an attack A affects a sound CPS M if the execution of the compound system M A differs from that of the original system M in an observable manner. Basically, a physics-based attack can influence the system under attack in at least two different ways:
• The system M A might deadlock when M may not; this means that the attack A affects the availability of the system. We recall that in the context of CPSs, deadlock is a particularly severe physical event. Thus, if a system M is vulnerable to an attack A of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] during the time interval m ..n , then the attack operates during the interval m..n, but it influences the system under attack in the time interval m ..n (obviously, m ≥ m). If n is finite, then we have a temporary attack; otherwise, we have a permanent attack. Furthermore, if m − n is big enough and n − m is small, then we have a quick, nasty attack that affects the system late enough to allow attack camouflages [24] . However, if m is significantly smaller than n, then the attack affects the observable behaviour of the system well before its termination, and the CPS has good chances of undertaking countermeasures to stop the attack. Finally, if M A t − −− → deadlock − −−−− →, for some trace t, then we say that the attack A is lethal, as it is capable to halt (deadlock) the CPS M. This is obviously a permanent attack.
Note that, according to Definition 4.3, the tolerance (or vulnerability) of a CPS also depends on the capability of the IDS component to detect and signal undesired physical behaviours. In fact, the IDS component might be designed to detect abnormal physical behaviours going well further than deadlocks and violations of safety conditions.
According to the literature, we say that an attack is stealthy if it is able to drive the CPS under attack into an incorrect physical state (either deadlock or violation of the safety conditions) without being noticed by the IDS component.
Three Different Attacks on the Physical Devices of the CPS Sys
In this subsection, we present three different attacks to the CPS Sys described in Section 3. The formal proofs of the propositions stating the tolerance and/or the vulnerability of Sys with respect to these three attacks can be found in the associated technical report [39] . Here, we use Uppaal SMC to verify the models associated to the system under attack to detect deadlocks, violations of safety conditions, and IDS failures. Here, the attack A m operates exclusively in the mth time slot when it tries to drop an eventual cooling command (on or off) coming from the controller and fabricates a fake command to turn off the cooling system. Thus, if the controller sends in the mth time slot a command to turn off the coolant, then nothing bad happens, as the attack will put the same message back. However, if the controller sends a command to turn the cooling on, then the attack will drop the command. We recall that the controller will turn on the cooling only if the sensed temperature is greater than 10 (and hence temp > 9.9); this may happen only if m > 8. Since the command to turn the cooling on is never re-sent by Ctrl, the temperature will continue to rise, and after only four time units the system may violate the safety conditions emitting an action unsafe, while the IDS component will start sending alarms every five time units, until the whole system deadlocks, because the temperature reaches the threshold of 50 degrees. Here, the IDS component of Sys is able to detect the attack with only one time unit delay. To support the statement of Proposition 4.5, we verify our Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which the communication network used by the controller to access the actuator is compromised. More precisely, we replace the _Proxy_Actuator_ automaton of Figure 5 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 7 , that implements the malicious activities of the MITM attacker A m of Example 4.4.
We have done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1K time units long and restricting the attack time m in the time interval 1..300. The results of our analysis are:
• when m ∈ 1..8, the attack is harmless, as the system results to be safe, deadlock-free, and alarm-free, with probability 0.99; • when m ∈ 9..300, we have the following situation:
-the probability that at the attack time m the controller sends a command to activate the cooling system (thus, triggering the attacker that will drop the command) can be obtained by verifying the property ♦ [0,m] (Cooling_on ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ m); as shown in Figure 8 , when m grows in the time interval 1..300, the resulting probability stabilises around the value 0.096; -up to the m+3 th time slot, the system under attack remains safe, i.e., both properties [1,m+3] (safe) and [1,m+3] (¬deadlock) hold with probability 0.99; -up to the m+4 th time slot, no alarms are fired, i.e., the property [1,m+4] (¬alarm) holds with probability 0.99 (no false positives); -in the m+4 th time slot, the system under attack might become unsafe as the probability, for m ∈ 9..300, that the property ♦ [0,m+4] (¬safe) is satisfied stabilises around the value 0.095 8 ; -in the m+5 th time slot, the IDS may fire an alarm as the probability, for m ∈ 9..300, that the property ♦ [0,m+5] (alarm) is satisfied stabilises around the value 0.094 9 ; -the system under attack may deadlock as the property ♦ [0,1000] (deadlocks) is satisfied with probability 0.096. 10 Here, the attack A m behaves as follows: It sleeps for m − 1 time slots and then, in the following time slot, it sniffs the current temperature at sensor s t . If the sensed temperature v is greater than 10, then it moves to the next time slot and restarts sniffing; otherwise, from that time on it will keep sending the same temperature v to the logical components (controller and IDS). Actually, once the forgery activity starts, the process Ctrl will always receive a temperature below 10 and will never activate the cooling system (and consequently the IDS). As a consequence, the system under attack Sys A will first move to an unsafe state until the invariant will be violated and the system will deadlock. Indeed, in the worst execution scenario, already in the m+1 th time slot the temperature may exceed 10 degrees, and after four tick-actions in the m+5 th time slot, the system may violate the safety conditions emitting an unsafe action. Since the temperature will keep growing without any cooling activity, the deadlock of the CPS cannot be avoided. This is a lethal attack, as it causes a shutdown of the system; it is also a stealthy attack, as it remains undetected, because the IDS never gets into action. 8 Since this probability coincides with that of ♦ [0,m] (Cooling_on ∧ дlobal _clock ≥ m), it appears very likely that the activation of the cooling system in the m th time slot triggers the attacker whose activity drags the system into an unsafe state with a delay of four time slots. 9 As the two probabilities are pretty much the same, and [1,m+3] (safe) and [1,m+4] (¬alarm) hold, the IDS seems to be quite effective in detecting the violations of the safety conditions in the m+4 th time slot, with only one time slot delay. 10 Since the probabilities are still the same, we argue that when the system reaches an unsafe state, then it is not able to recover and it is doomed to deadlock. A Formal Approach to Physics-based Attacks in Cyber-physical Systems 3:21 Here, we verify the Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which we assume that its sensor device is compromised (we recall that our MITM forgery attack on sensors or actuators can be assimilated to device compromise). In particular, we replace the _Sensor_ automaton of Figure 4 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 9 , and implementing the malicious activities of the MITM attacker A m of Example 4.6.
We have done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1K time units long and restricting the attack time m in the integer interval 9..300. The results of our analysis are:
• up to the m+4 th time slot, the system under attack remains safe, deadlock-free, and alarmfree, i.e., all three properties [1,m+4] (safe), [1,m+4] (¬deadlock), and [1,m+4] (¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99; • in the m+5 th time slot, the system under attack might become unsafe as the probability, for m ∈ 9..300, that the property ♦ [0,m+5] (¬safe) is satisfied stabilises around 0.104; • the system under attack will eventually deadlock not later than 80 time slots after the attack time m, as the property [m+80,1000] (deadlocks) is satisfied with probability 0.99; • finally, the attack is stealthy, as the property [1, 1000] (¬alarm) holds with probability 0.99. Now, let us examine a similar but less severe attack. 
In this attack, for n consecutive time slots, A n sends to the logical components (controller and IDS) the current sensed temperature decreased by an offset 4. The effect of this attack on the system depends on the duration n of the attack itself: (i) for n ≤ 8, the attack is harmless, as the variable temp may not reach a (critical) temperature above 9.9; (ii) for n = 9, the variable temp might reach a temperature above 9.9 in the 9th time slot, and the attack would delay the activation of the cooling system of one time slot-as a consequence, the system might get into an unsafe state in the time interval 14..15, but no alarm will be fired; (iii) for n ≥ 10, the system may get into an unsafe state in the time slot 14 and in the following n + 11 time slots-in this case, this would not be stealthy attack, as the IDS will fire the alarm with a delay of at most two time slots later, rather this is a temporary attack that ends in the time slot n + 11. Proposition 4.9. Let Sys be our use case and A n be the attack defined in Example 4.8. Then:
• Sys A n Sys, for n ≤ 8, • Sys A n 14.. 15 Sys, for n = 9, • Sys A n 14..n+11 Sys, for n ≥ 10. Here, we verify the Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which we replace the _Proxy_Sensor_ automaton of Figure 5 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 10 , and implementing the MITM activities of the attacker A n of Example 4.8.
We have done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1K time units long and assuming that the duration of the attack n may vary in the integer interval 1..300. The results of our analysis are:
• when n ∈ 1..8, the system under attack remains safe, deadlock-free, and alarm-free, i.e., all three properties [1, 1000] (safe), [1, 1000] (¬deadlock), and [1, 1000] (¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99; • when n = 9, we have the following situation:
-the system under attack is deadlock-free, i.e., the property [1, 1000] (¬deadlock) holds with probability 0.99; -the system remains safe and alarm-free, except for the time interval 14..15, i.e., all the following properties [1, 13] (safe), [1, 13] (¬alarm), [16, 1000] (safe), and [16, 1000] (¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99; -in the time interval 14..15, we may have violations of safety conditions, as the property ♦ [0,14] (¬safe ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ 14) is satisfied with a probability 0.62, while the property ♦ [0,15] (¬safe ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ 15) is satisfied with probability 0.21; both violations are stealthy, as the property [14, 15] (¬alarm) holds with probability 0.99; • when n ≥ 10, we have the following situation:
-the system is deadlock-free, i.e., the property [1, 1000] (¬deadlock) holds with probability 0.99; -the system remains safe, except for the time interval 14..n+11, i.e., the two properties [1, 13] (safe) and [n+12,1000] (safe) hold with probability 0.99; -the system is alarm-free, except for the time interval n+1..n+11, i.e., the two properties [0,n] (¬alarm) and [n+12,1000] (¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99; -in the 14th time slot, the system under attack may reach an unsafe state as the probability, for n ∈ 10..300, that the property ♦ [0,14] (¬safe ∧ дlobal_clock ≥ 14) is satisfied stabilises around 0.548; -once the attack has terminated, in the time interval n+1..n+11, the system under attack has good chances to reach an unsafe state as the probability, for n ∈ 10..300, that the property ♦ [0,n+11] (¬safe ∧ n+1 ≤ дlobal_clock ≤ n+11) is satisfied stabilises around 0.672; -the violations of the safety conditions remain completely stealthy only up to the duration n of the attack (we recall that [0,n] (¬alarm) is satisfied with probability 0.99); the probability, for n ∈ 10..300, that the property ♦ [0,n+11] (alarm) is satisfied stabilises around 0.13; thus, in the time interval n+1..n+11, only a small portion of violations of safety conditions are detected by the IDS, while a great majority of them remains stealthy. 
A Technique for Proving Attack Tolerance/Vulnerability
In this subsection, we provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary class C. Actually, we do more than that: We provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to all attacks of any class C that is somehow "weaker" than a given class C.
, be two classes of attacks, with m 1 ..n 1 ⊆ m 2 ..n 2 . We say that C 1 is weaker than C 2 , written C 1 C 2 , if C 1 (ι) ⊆ C 2 (ι) for any ι ∈ I.
Intuitively, if C 1 C 2 , then: (i) the attacks of class C 1 might achieve fewer malicious activities than any attack of class C 2 (formally, there may be ι ∈ I such that C 1 (ι) = ∅ and C 2 (ι) ∅); (ii) for those malicious activities ι ∈ I achieved by the attacks of both classes C 1 and C 2 (i.e., C 1 (ι) ∅ and C 2 (ι) ∅), if they may be perpetrated by the attacks of class C 1 at some time slot k ∈ m 1 ..n 1 (i.e., k ∈ C 1 (ι)), then all attacks of class C 2 may do the same activity ι at the same time k (i.e., k ∈ C 2 (ι)).
The next objective is to define a notion of most powerful attack (also called top attacker) of a given class C, such that, if a CPS M tolerates the most powerful attack of class C, then it also tolerates any attack of class C , with C C. We will provide a similar condition for attack vulnerability: let M be a CPS vulnerable to Top(C) in the time interval m 1 ..n 1 ; then, for any attack A of class C , with C C, if M is vulnerable to A, then it is so for a smaller time interval m 2 ..n 2 ⊆ m 1 ..n 1 . Our notion of top attacker has two extra ingredients with respect to the physics-based attacks seen up to now: (i) nondeterminism and (ii) time-unguarded recursive processes. This extra power of the top attacker is not a problem, as we are looking for sufficient criteria.
With respect to nondeterminism, we assume a generic procedure rnd () that given an arbitrary set Z returns an element of Z chosen in a nondeterministic manner. This procedure allows us to express nondeterministic choice, P ⊕ Q, as an abbreviation for the process if Note that, for T = ∅, we assume sup(T ) = −∞. We can now use the definition above to formalise the notion of most powerful attack of a given class C. Definition 4.11 (Top Attacker) . Let C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] be a class of attacks. We define
as the most powerful attack, or top attacker, of class C.
The following theorem provides soundness criteria for attack tolerance and attack vulnerability: •
Corollary 4.13. Let M be an honest and sound CPS, and C a class of attacks. If Top(C) is not lethal for M, then any attack A of class C , with C C, is not lethal for M. If Top(C) is not a permanent attack for M, then any attack A of class C , with C C, is not a permanent attack for M.
The following example illustrates how Theorem 4.12 could be used to infer attack tolerance/ vulnerability with respect to an entire class of attacks. In the following analysis in Uppaal SMC of the top attacker Top(C m ), we will show that both the vulnerability window and the probability of successfully attacking the system represent an upper bound for the attack A m of Example 4.4 of class C m . Technically, we verify the Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which we replace the _Proxy_Actuator_ automaton of Figure 5 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 11 , and implementing the activities of the top attacker Top(C m ). We carry out our analysis with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1K time slots long, limiting the attack time m to the integer interval 1..300.
To explain our analysis further, let us provide details on how Top(C m ) affects Sys when compared to the attacker A m of class C m seen in the Example 4.4.
• In the time interval 1..m, the attacked system remains safe, deadlock-free, and alarm-free.
Formally, the three properties [1,m] (safe), [1,m] (¬deadlock), and [1,m] (¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99. Thus, in this time interval, the top attacker is harmless, as well as A m . • In the time interval m+1..m+3, the system exposed to the top attacker may deadlock when m ∈ 1..8; for m > 8 the system under attack is deadlock-free (see Figure 12 ). This is because the top attacker, unlike the attacker A m , can forge in the first eight time slots cool-on commands turning on the cooling and dropping the temperature below zero in the time interval m+1..m+3. Note that no alarms or unsafe behaviours occur in this case, as neither the safety process nor the IDS check whether the temperature drops below a certain threshold. Formally, the properties [m+1,m+3] (safe) and [m+1,m+3] (¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99, as already seen for the attacker A m . • In the time interval m+4..1000, the top attacker has better chances to deadlock the system when compared with the attacker A m (see Figure 13 ). With respect to safety and alarms, the top attacker and the attacker A m have the same probability of success (the properties probability of successful attack the system. Of course, the accuracy of such approximation cannot be estimated a priori.
IMPACT OF A PHYSICS-BASED ATTACK
In the previous section, we have grouped physics-based attacks by focussing on the physical devices under attack and the timing aspects of the attack (Definition 4.2). Then, we have provided a formalisation of when a CPS should be considered tolerant/vulnerable to an attack (Definition 4.3). In this section, we show that these two formalisations are important not only to demonstrate the tolerance (or vulnerability) of a CPS with respect to certain attacks, but also to evaluate the disruptive impact of those attacks on the target CPS [21, 44] .
The goal of this section is to provide a formal metric to estimate the impact of a successful attack on the physical behaviour of a CPS. In particular, we focus on the ability that an attack may have to drag a CPS out of the correct behaviour modelled by its evolution map with the given uncertainty.
Recall that evol is monotone with respect to the uncertainty. Thus, as stated in Proposition 5.1, an increase of the uncertainty may translate into a widening of the range of the possible behaviours of the CPS. In the following, given the physical environment E = evol, meas, inv, safe, ξ w , ξ e , we write E[ξ w ← ξ w ] as an abbreviation for evol, meas, inv, safe, ξ w , ξ e ; similarly, for M = E; S P, However, a wider uncertainty in the model does not always correspond to a widening of the possible behaviours of the CPS. In fact, this depends on the intrinsic tolerance of a CPS with respect to changes in the uncertainty function. In the following, we will write ξ w + ξ w to denote the function ξ w ∈ R X such that ξ w (x ) = ξ w (x ) + ξ w (x ), for any x ∈ X.
Definition 5.2 (System ξ -tolerance). An honest and sound CPS
Intuitively, if a CPS M has been designed with a given uncertainty ξ w , but M is actually ξtolerant, with ξ > 0, then the uncertainty ξ w is somehow underestimated: The real uncertainty of M is given by ξ w + ξ . This information is quite important when trying to estimate the impact of an attack on a CPS. In fact, if a system M has been designed with a given uncertainty ξ w , but M is actually ξ -tolerant, with ξ > 0, then an attack has (at least) a "room for manoeuvre" ξ to degrade the whole CPS without being observed (and hence detected).
Let Sys be our running example. In the rest of the section, with an abuse of notation, we will write Sys[δ ← γ ] to denote Sys where the uncertainty δ of the variable temp has been replaced with γ .
Example 5.3. The CPS Sys is 1 20 -tolerant as sup{ξ : Sys[δ ← δ +η] Sys, for 0 ≤ η ≤ ξ } is equal to 1 20 . Since δ + ξ = 8 20 + 1 20 = 9 20 , then this statement relies on the following proposition whose proof can be found in the associated technical report [39] :
Sys, for γ ∈ ( 8 20 , 9 20 ),
Sys, for γ > 9 20 . Now everything is in place to define our metric to estimate the impact of an attack.
Definition 5.5 (Impact). Let M be an honest and sound CPS with uncertainty ξ w . We say that an attack A has definitive impact ξ on the system M if
It has pointwise impact ξ on the system M at time m if
Intuitively, the impact of an attacker A on a system M measures the perturbation introduced by the presence of the attacker in the compound system M A with respect to the original system M. With this definition, we can establish either the definitive (and hence maximum) impact of the attack A on the system M or the impact at a specific time m. In the latter case, by definition of m..n , there are two possibilities: Either the impact of the attack keeps growing after time m; or in the time interval m+1, the system under attack deadlocks.
The impact of Top(C) provides an upper bound for the impact of all attacks of class C , C C, as shown in the following theorem (proved in the Appendix):
Theorem 5.6 (Top Attacker's Impact). Let M be an honest and sound CPS, and C an arbitrary class of attacks. Let A be an arbitrary attack of class C , with C C.
• The definitive impact of Top(C) on M is greater than or equal to the definitive impact of A on M. • If Top(C) has pointwise impact ξ on M at time m, and A has pointwise impact ξ on M at time m , with m ≤ m, then ξ ≤ ξ .
To help the intuition on the impact metric defined in Definition 5.5, we give a couple of examples. Here, we focus on the role played by the size of the vulnerability window.
Example 5.7. Let us consider the attack A n of Example 4.8, for n ∈ {8, 9, 10}. Then,
• A 8 has definitive impact 0 on Sys, • A 9 has definitive impact 0.23 on Sys, • A 10 has definitive impact 0.4 on Sys.
Formally, the impacts of these three attacks are obtained by calculating
for n ∈ {8, 9, 10}. Attack A 9 has a very low impact on Sys, as it may drag the system into a temporary unsafe state in the time interval 14..15, whereas A 10 has a slightly stronger impact, as it may induce a temporary unsafe state during the larger time interval 14..21. Technically, since δ + ξ = 0.4 + 0.4 = 0.8, the calculation of the impact of A 10 relies on the following proposition whose proof can be found in the associated technical report [39] .
Proposition 5.8. Let A 10 be the attack defined in Example 4.8. Then:
However, the attack provided in Example 4.6, driving the system to a (permanent) deadlock state, has a much stronger impact on the CPS Sys than the attack of Example 4.8.
Example 5.9. Let us consider the attack A m of Example 4.6, for m > 8. As already discussed, this is a stealthy lethal attack that has a very severe and high impact. In fact, it has a definitive impact of 8.5 on the CPS Sys. Formally,
Technically, since δ + ξ = 0.4 + 8.5 = 8.9, what is stated in this example relies on the following proposition whose proof can be found in the associated technical report [39] : Thus, Definition 5.5 provides an instrument to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS in terms of the perturbation introduced both on its physical and on its logical processes. However, there is at least another question that a CPS designer could ask: "Is there a way to estimate the chances that an attack will be successful during the execution of my CPS?" To paraphrase in a more operational manner: How many execution traces of my CPS are prone to be attacked by a specific attack? As argued in the future work, we believe that probabilistic metrics might reveal to be very useful in this respect [41] .
CONCLUSIONS, RELATED AND FUTURE WORK 6.1 Summary
We have provided theoretical foundations to reason about and formally detect attacks to physical devices of CPSs. A straightforward utilisation of these methodologies is for model-checking or monitoring to be able to formally analyse security properties of CPSs either before system deployment or, when static analysis is not feasible, at runtime to promptly detect undesired behaviours. To that end, we have proposed a hybrid process calculus, called CCPSA, as a formal specification language to model physical and cyber components of CPSs as well as MITM physics-based attacks. Note that our calculus is general enough to represent Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems as cyber components that can easily interact with controllers and IDSs via channel communications. SCADA systems are the main technology used by system engineers to supervise the activities of complex CPSs.
Based on CCPSA and its labelled transition semantics, we have formalised a threat model for CPSs by grouping physics-based attacks in classes according to the target physical devices and two timing parameters: begin and duration of the attacks. Then, we developed two different compositional trace semantics for CCPSA to assess attack tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack. Such a tolerance may hold ad infinitum or for a limited amount of time. In the latter case, the CPS under attack is vulnerable and the attack affects the observable behaviour of the system only after a certain point in time, when the attack itself may already be achieved or still working.
Along the lines of GNDC [17] , we have defined a notion of top attacker, Top(C), of a given class of attacks C, which has been used to provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to all attacks of class C (and weaker ones).
Then, we have provided a metric to estimate the maximum impact introduced in the system under attack with respect to its genuine behaviour according to its evolution law and the uncertainty of the model. We have proved that the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C) represents an upper bound for the impact of any attack A of class C (and weaker ones).
Finally, we have formalised a running example in Uppaal SMC [15] , the statistical extension of the Uppaal model checker [5] . Our goal was to test Uppaal SMC as an automatic tool for the static security analysis of a simple but significant CPS exposed to a number of different physicsbased attacks with different impacts on the system under attack. Here, it is important to note that, although we have verified most of the properties stated in the article, we have not been able to capture time properties on the responsiveness of the IDS to violations of the safety conditions. Examples of such properties are: (i) there are time slots m and k such that the system may have an unsafe state at some time n > m, and the IDS detects this violation with a delay of at least k time slots (k being a lower bound of the reaction time of the IDS), or (ii) there is a time slot n in which the IDS fires an alarm but neither an unsafe state nor a deadlock occurs in the time interval n−k..n+k: this would provide a tolerance of the occurrence of false positive. Furthermore, Uppaal SMC does not support the verification of nested formulae. Thus, although from a designer's point of view it would have been much more practical to verify a logic formula of the form ∃♦( [t,t +5] temp > 9.9) to check safety and invariant conditions, in Uppaal SMC, we had to implement a _Safety_ automaton that is not really part of our CPS (for more details, see the discussion of related work).
Related Work
A number of approaches have been proposed for modelling CPSs using hybrid process algebras [7, 14, 20, 52, 57] . Among these approaches, our calculus CCPSA shares some similarities with the ϕ-calculus [52] . However, unlike CCPSA, in the ϕ-calculus, given a hybrid system (E, P ), the process P can dynamically change the evolution law in E. Furthermore, the ϕ-calculus does not have a representation of physical devices and measurement law, which are instead crucial for us to model physics-based attacks that operate in a timely fashion on sensors and actuators. More recently, Galpin et al. [20] have proposed a process algebra in which the continuous part of the system is represented by appropriate variables whose changes are determined by active influences (i.e., commands on actuators).
Many good surveys on the security of cyber-physical systems have been published recently (see, e.g., References [2, 23, 62, 63] ), including a survey of surveys [22] . In particular, the surveys [62, 63] provide a systematic categorisation of 138 selected papers on CPS security. Among those 138 papers, 65 adopt a discrete notion of time similar to ours, 26 a continuous one, 55 a quasi-static time model, and the rest use a hybrid time model. This study encouraged us in adopting a discrete time model for physical processes rather than a continuous one. Still, one might wonder what is actually lost when one adopts a discrete rather than a continuous time model, in particular when the attacker has the possibility to move in a continuous time setting. A continuous time model is, of course, more expressive. For instance, Kanovich et al. [32] identified a novel vulnerability in the context of cryptographic protocols for CPSs in which the attacker works in a continuous-time setting to fool discrete-time verifiers. However, we believe that, for physics-based attacks, little is lost by adopting a discrete time model. In fact, sensor measurements and actuator commands are elaborated within controllers, which are digital devices with an intrinsic discrete notion of time. In particular, with respect to dropping of actuator commands and forging of sensor measurements, there are no differences between discrete-time and continuous-time attackers given that to achieve those malicious activities the attacker has to synchronise with the controller. Thus, there remain only two potential malicious activities: sensor sniffing and forging of actuator commands. Can a continuous-time attacker, able to carry out these two malicious activities, be more disruptive than a similar attacker adopting a discrete-time model? This would only be the case when dealing with very rare physical processes changing their physical state in an extremely fast way, faster than the controller that is the one dictating the discrete time of the CPS. However, we believe that CPSs of this kind would be hardly controllable, as they would pose serious safety issues even in the absence of any attacker.
Reference [23] provides an exhaustive review of papers on physics-based anomaly detection proposing a unified taxonomy, whereas Reference [2] presents the main solutions in the estimation of the consequences of cyber-attacks, attacks modelling and detection, and the development of security architecture (the main types of attacks and threats against CPSs are analysed and grouped in a tree structure).
Huang et al. [30] were among the first to propose threat models for CPSs. Along with References [33, 34] , they stressed the role played by timing parameters on integrity and DoS attacks.
Gollmann et al. [24] discussed possible goals (equipment damage, production damage, compliance violation) and stages (access, discovery, control, damage, cleanup) of physics-based attacks. In this article, we focused on the "damage" stage, where the attacker already has a rough idea of the plant and the control architecture of the target CPS. As we remarked in Section 1, here, we focus on an attacker who has already entered the CPS without considering how the attacker gained access to the system, which could have happened in several ways-for instance, by attacking an Internetaccessible controller or one of the communication protocols.
Almost all papers discussed in the surveys mentioned above [2, 23, 63] investigate attacks on CPSs and their protection by relying on simulation test systems to validate the results, rather than formal methodologies. We are aware of a number of works applying formal methods to CPS security, although they apply methods, and most of the time have goals, that are quite different from ours. The most significant ones are discussed in the following:
Burmester et al. [11] employed hybrid timed automata to give a threat framework based on the traditional Byzantine faults model for crypto-security. However, as remarked in Reference [55] , physics-based attacks and faults have inherently distinct characteristics. Faults are considered as physical events that affect the system behaviour where simultaneous events do not act in a coordinated way; whereas cyber attacks may be performed over a significant number of attack points and in a coordinated way.
In Reference [59] , Vigo presented an attack scenario that addresses some of the peculiarities of a cyber-physical adversary and discussed how this scenario relates to other attack models popular in the security protocol literature. Then, in Reference [60] Vigo et al. proposed an untimed calculus of broadcasting processes equipped with notions of failed and unwanted communication. These works differ quite considerably from ours, e.g., they focus on DoS attacks without taking into consideration timing aspects or impact of the attack.
Cómbita et al. [13] and Zhu and Basar [64] applied game theory to capture the conflict of goals between an attacker who seeks to maximise the damage inflicted to a CPS's security and a defender who aims to minimise it [43] .
Rocchetto and Tippenhauer [51] introduced a taxonomy of the diverse attacker models proposed for CPS security and outlined requirements for generalised attacker models; in Reference [50] , they then proposed an extended Dolev-Yao attacker model suitable for CPSs. In their approach, physical layer interactions are modelled as abstract interactions between logical components to support reasoning on the physical-layer security of CPSs. This is done by introducing additional orthogonal channels. Time is not represented.
Nigam et al. [46] worked around the notion of Timed Dolev-Yao Intruder Models for Cyber-Physical Security Protocols by bounding the number of intruders required for the automated verification of such protocols. Following a tradition in security protocol analysis, they provide an answer to the question: How many intruders are enough for verification and where should they be placed? They also extend the strand space model to CPS protocols by allowing for the symbolic representation of time so they can use the tool Maude [47] along with SMT support. Their notion of time is, however, different from ours, as they focus on the time a message needs to travel from one agent to another. The paper does not mention physical devices, such as sensors and/or actuators.
There are a few approaches that carry out information flow security analysis on discrete/ continuous models for CPSs. Akella et al. [1] proposed an approach to perform information flow analysis, including both trace-based analysis and automated analysis through process algebra specification. This approach has been used to verify process algebra models of a gas pipeline system and a smart electric power grid system. Bodei et al. [9] proposed a process calculus supporting a control flow analysis that safely approximates the abstract behaviour of IoT systems. Essentially, they track how data spread from sensors to the logics of the network and how physical data are manipulated. In Reference [8] , the same authors extend their work to infer quantitative measures to establish the cost of possibly security countermeasures in terms of time and energy. Another discrete model has been proposed by Wang [61] , where Petri-net models have been used to verify non-deducibility security properties of a natural gas pipeline system. More recently, Bohrer and Platzer [10] introduced dHL, a hybrid logic for verifying cyber-physical hybrid-dynamic information flows, communicating information through both discrete computation and physical dynamics, so security is ensured even when attackers observe continuously changing values in continuous time.
Huang et al. [29] proposed a risk assessment method that uses a Bayesian network to model the attack propagation process and infers the probabilities of sensors and actuators to be compromised. These probabilities are fed into a stochastic hybrid system (SHS) model to predict the evolution of the physical process being controlled. Then, the security risk is quantified by evaluating the system availability with the SHS model.
As regards tools for the formal verification of CPSs, we remark that we tried to verify our case study using model-checking tools for distributed systems such as PRISM [36] , Uppaal [6] , Real-Time Maude [47] , and prohver within the MODEST TOOLSET [26] . In particular, as our example adopts a discrete notion of time, we started looking at tools supporting discrete time. PRISM, for instance, relies on Markov decision processes or discrete-time Markov chains, depending on whether one is interested in modelling nondeterminism or not. It supports the verification of both CTL and LTL properties (when dealing with nonprobabilistic systems). This allowed us to express the formula ∃♦( [t,t +5] temp > 9.9) to verify violations of the safety conditions, avoiding the implementation of the _Safety_ automaton. However, using integer variables to represent state variables with a fixed precision requires the introduction of extra transitions (to deal with nondeterministic errors), which significantly complicates the PRISM model. In this respect, Uppaal appears to be more efficient than PRISM, as we have been able to concisely express the error occurring in integer state variables thanks to the select() construct, in which the user can fix the granularity adopted to approximate a dense interval. This discrete representation provides an under-approximation of the system behaviour; thus, a finer granularity translates into an exponential increase of the complexity of the system with obvious consequences on the verification performance. Then, we tried to model our case study in Real-Time Maude, a completely different framework for real-time systems, based on rewriting logic. The language supports object-like inheritance features that are quite helpful to represent complex systems in a modular manner. We used communication channels to implement our attacks on the physical devices. Furthermore, we used rational variables for a more concise, discrete representation of state variables. We have been able to verify LTL and T-CTL properties, although the verification process resulted to be quite slow due to a proliferation of rewriting rules when fixing a reasonable granularity to approximate dense intervals. As the verification logic is quite powerful, there is no need to implement an ad hoc process to check for safety. Finally, we also tried to model our case study in the safety model checker prohver within the Modest Toolset (see Reference [38] ). We specified our case study in the high-level language HModest, supporting: (i) differential inclusion to model linear CPSs with constant bounded derivatives; (ii) linear formulae to express nondeterministic assignments within a dense interval; (iii) a compositional programming style inherited from process algebra; (iv) shared actions to synchronise parallel components. However, we faced the same performance limitations encountered in Uppaal. Thus, we decided to move to statistical model checking.
Finally, this article extends the preliminary conference version [40] in the following aspects: (i) the calculus has been slightly redesigned by distinguishing physical state and physical environment, adding specifying constructs to sniff, drop, and forge packets, and removing, for simplicity, protected physical devices; (ii) the two trace semantics have been proven to be compositional, i.e., preserved by properly defined contexts; (iii) both our running example Sys and the attacks proposed in Examples 4.4, 4.6, 4.8, and 4.14 have been implemented and verified in Uppaal SMC.
Future Work
While much is still to be done, we believe that our article provides a stepping stone for the development of formal and automated tools to analyse the security of CPSs. We will consider applyingpossibly after proper enhancements-existing tools and frameworks for automated security protocol analysis, resorting to the development of a dedicated tool if existing ones prove not up to the task. We will also consider further security properties and concrete examples of CPSs, as well as other kinds of physics-based attacks, such as delays in the communication of measurements and/or commands and periodic attacks, i.e., attacks that operate in a periodic fashion inducing periodic physical effects on the targeted system that may be easily confused by engineers with system malfunctions. This will allow us to refine the classes of attacks we have given here (e.g., by formalising a type system amenable to static analysis) and provide a formal definition of when a CPS is more secure than another so as to be able to design, by progressive refinement, secure variants of vulnerable CPSs.
We also aim to extend the behavioural theory of CCPSA by developing suitable probabilistic metrics to take into consideration the probability of a specific trace to actually occur. We have already made some progress in this direction for a variant of CCPSA with no security features in it by defining ad hoc compositional bisimulation metrics [42] . In this manner, we believe that our notion of impact might be refined by taking into account quantitative aspects of an attack such as the probability of being successful when targeting a specific CPS. A first attempt on a (much) simpler IoT setting can be found in Reference [41] .
Finally, with respect to automatic approximations of the impact, while we have not yet fully investigated the problem, we believe that we can transform it into a "minimum problem." For instance, if the environment uses linear functions, then, by adapting techniques developed for linear hybrid automata (see, e.g., Reference [3] ), the set of all traces with length at most n (for a fixed n) can be characterised by a system of first-degree inequalities, so the measure of the impact could be translated into a linear programming problem.
APPENDIX

A PROOFS
As already stated in Remark 2, our trace preorder is deadlock-sensitive. Formally, Lemma A.1. Let M and N be two CPSs in CCPSA such that M N . Then, M satisfies its system invariant if and only if N satisfies its system invariant.
Proof. This is because CPSs that do not satisfy their invariant can only fire deadlock actions.
Proof of Theorem 2.10. We prove the three statements separately. . This is similar to the case α = cv by considering the fact that ξ x safe implies that ξ x ∪ ξ x safe ∪ safe , for any ξ x and any safe . Inductive case. We have to prove that
=⇒ N n O n . We can use the inductive hypothesis to easily deal with the first n − 1 actions and resort to the base case to handle the nth action.
(2) We have to prove that M N implies M P N P, for any pure-logical process P. This is a special case of (1), as M P = M (∅; ∅ P ) and N P = N (∅; ∅ P ), where ∅; ∅ P is a CPS with no physical process in it, only logics. To prove Theorem 2.12, we adapt to CCPSA two standard lemmata used in process calculi theory to compose and decompose the actions performed by a compound system. To conclude the proof, we observe that if P A τ − −− → P A is derived by an application of a rule different from ( SensIntegr ) and ( ActDrop ), then by inspection of Table 1 and by definition of attacker, it follows that A cannot perform a τ -action, since A does not use channel communication and performs only malicious actions. Thus, the only possibility is that the τ -action is performed by P in isolation. As a consequence, by applying the rules 
